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THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
DAVID E. VANDERCOY*
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Long overlooked or ignored, the Second Amendment has become the object
of some study and much debate. One issue being discussed is whether the
Second Amendment recognizes the right of each citizen to keep and bear arms,2
or whether the right belongs solely to state governments and empowers each
state to maintain a military force.3
The debate has resulted in odd political alignments which in turn have
caused the Second Amendment to be described recently as the most
embarrassing provision of the Bill of Rights.4 Embarrassment results from the
politics associated with determining whether the language creates a state's right
or an individual right. Civil libertarians support the individual rights recognized
in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and defend these rights
against governmental abuse. Civil libertarians insist that each citizen be
accorded the right to free speech, even if the citizen is a Nazi hatemonger.
Similarly, criminals can count on a vigorous defense of the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches as well as the fifth amendment right
not to incriminate oneself. All of this is true even though most of us would
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See generally David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited,
5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 40-41 (1976) (arguing that the first Congress stated that a well-regulated
militia was "necessary" to the security of a free state, not just "sufficient," and that Congress
recognized that the ordinary processes of law may be insufficient to protect the people at all times).
3. See generally Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 57 (1989)
(arguing that the Framers' intent behind the Second Amendment was to assure the states that they
would retain the right to an organized and effective militia, not to create broad individual rights);
Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REV.
46, 67-70 (1966) (asserting that the Second Amendment refers to the collective right of the body
politic of every state to be protected by an independent state militia).
4. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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agree that Nazi hate language is of no utility, and a criminal's confession, absent
coercion, and the fruits of a search of his or her house are among the best
indicators of actual guilt or innocence. Yet, we zealously defend these rights
on the premise that governmental abuse of power is a greater evil than that
posed by individual hatemongers or criminals.
In the context of the Second Amendment, civil libertarian instincts are
overcome by our fear of one another. As a consequence, we find civil
libertarian organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
acting as participants in such groups as the National Coalition to Ban
Handguns.' Indeed, the ACLU, typically at the forefront of defending
individual rights against an encroaching government, takes the position that the
Second Amendment protects only the state's right to an organized military-a
well-regulated militia. It rejects any suggestion that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right.
While this phenomenon is interesting, it is not the subject of this Article.
My purpose is much narrower. I will address the history of the Second
Amendment and attempt to define its original intent. I will not suggest that
original intent is controlling. On this point, I am reminded that George
Washington once suggested, "Individuals entering into society, must give up a
share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must
5. See Don P. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 207 (1983). The ACLU's summary of its national board's
action at the June 14-15, 1980, meeting sets out the following policy considerations:
The setting in which the Second Amendment was proposed and adopted
demonstrates that the right to bear arms is a collective one existing only in the collective
population of each state for the purpose of maintaining an effective state militia.
The ACLU agrees with the Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of the
Second Amendment that the individual's right to bear arms applies only to the
preservation of efficiency of a well regulated militia. Except for lawful police and
military purposes, the possession of weapons by individuals is not constitutionally
protected. Therefore there is no constitutional impediment to the regulation of firearms.
Nor does the ACLU believe that there is a significant civil liberties value, apart
from the Second Amendment, in an individual right to own or use firearms. Interests
of privacy and self expression may be involved in any individual's choice of activities
or possessions, but these interests are attenuated when the activity, or the object sought
[sic] to be possessed is inherently dangerous to others. With respect to firearms, the
ACLU believes that this quality of dangerousness justifies legal, regulation which
substantially restricts the individual's interest in freedom of choice.
Id. at 207 n. 15. At the same meeting, the board approved the following clarification: "It is the
sense of this body that the word 'justifies' in the policy means we will affirmatively support gun
control legislation." Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/5
1994] SECOND AMENDMENT 1009
depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained."
The purpose of this Article is only to define those shares of liberty the
Framers intended to retain and those given up in the context of the Second
Amendment. By way of preview, this Article will contend that the original
intent of the Second Amendment was to protect each individual's right to keep
and bear arms, and to guarantee that individuals acting collectively could throw
off the yokes of any oppressive government which might arise. Thus, the right
envisioned was not only the right to be armed, but to be armed at a level equal
to the government.
To determine the original intent of the Second Amendment, this Article will
examine the history of armed citizens in England, the Federalist and
Antifederalist debates, the meaning of the word "militia," the constitutional
ratification process, and the various state constitutions in existence at the time.
II. THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN
Eighteenth-century commentators frequently discussed the evils of standing
armies.' Blackstone observed that professional soldiers endangered liberty!
In free states, the defense of the realm was considered best left to citizens who
took up arms only when necessary and who returned to their communities and
occupations when the danger passed.9  Standing armies were viewed as
instruments of fear intended to preserve the prince.'
0
A. The Establishment of the English Citizen Army
Blackstone credits King Alfred, who ruled England from 871 to 901 A.D.,
as establishing the principle that all subjects of his dominion were the realm's
soldiers."' Other commentators trace the obligation of Englishmen to serve in
6. George Washington further stated, "It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line
between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be preserved . . . ." See
Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787) in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 305 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983).
7. See JOHN P. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAw: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE
TWO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 79-85 (1981).
8. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *320 [hereinafter COMMENTARIES].
9. See generally Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493 (1969) (explaining that the existence of a standing army during
peacetime was widely condemned as a threat to liberties).
10. Id.
11. COMMENTARIES, supra note 8, at *321.
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the people's army to 690 A.D.' 2 Regardless of the beginning date, an
Englishman's obligation to serve in a citizen army is an old proposition.
Coupled with this obligation to defend the realm was the obligation to provide
oneself with weapons for this purpose.'
3
King Henry II formalized his subjects' duties in 1181 by issuing the Assize
of Arms.' 4 The arms required varied depending on the subjects' wealth, with
the poorest freemen obligated to provide the least-an iron helmet and a
lance. "5 The Assize required not only arms to be possessed, but precluded the
possessor from selling, pledging, or in any other way alienating the weapons. 6
In 1253, the armed population was expanded beyond freemen to include serfs,
individuals bound to the land and the land's owner.17 Serfs were required to
procure a spear and dagger.'"
Inclusion of serfs in the citizen army was related to the mustering of men
and arms which occurred early in 1253 for purposes of crossing the sea to
Gascavy and supporting the realm against the King of Castile. 9 Another
general levy occurred in 1297, which directed all men possessing land to a value
of twenty pounds to provide themselves with horses and arms and to come to
London for purposes of service in France.' °
B. The Tudor Period
The citizen-army concept continued to develop through the Tudor period.
Henry VIII decreed that fathers must purchase longbows for sons between seven
and fourteen years of age and teach them to shoot."' Each citizen between the
age of fourteen and forty years was required to own and use a longbow unless
12. David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 562 (1986) [hereinafter Hardy, Armed Citizens].
13. William S. Fields &-David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History,
136 MIL. L. REv. 1, 8 (1992).
14. See Arthur Allen Left, The LeffDictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2078
(1985).
15. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 416 (David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway
eds., 1953) [hereinafter ENGLISH].
16. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 421-42, 565 (1968).
17. David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4
J.L. & POL. 1, 7 (1987) [hereinafter Hardy, Historiography].
18. Id.
19. SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 141 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick G.
Marcham eds., 1937) [hereinafter SOURCES].
20. Id. at 163.
21. 3 Hen. 8, ch. 13 (1511).
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disabled.' Queen Elizabeth I formalized the process by issuing instructions
for general musters of the citizen army in each county.' Commissions were
issued to various knights to take charge of such musters.2 The purpose of the
musters was to enable Queen Elizabeth to know the "numbers, qualities, abilities
and sufficiency of all her subjects in that county . . . .from the age of sixteen
years upward, that may be found able to bear armour or to use weapons on
horseback or on foot."' The citizen army, during Queen Elizabeth's reign,
acquired the name "militia."'
By the end of the Tudor period, the citizen army or militia concept had
become a fixed component in English life. The period's commentators
attributed English military successes to the universal armament practice prevalent
in England but absent on the continent. 7 Visitors from the continent even
noticed the stark difference.' Historians suggested that English universal
armament caused a moderation of monarchial rule and fostered individual
liberties because the populace had in reserve a check which soon brought the
fiercest and proudest King to reason: the check of physical force." However,
the virtues of universal armament and the effect of universal armament on
monarchial rule had not escaped Parliament's notice.
C. The Stuart Period
The early Stuart period was the single most important period in English
history in terms of shaping the political theory of the American revolutionary
leaders.' During this period, civil war occurred between Parliament and the
crown, a King was executed, another King fled to France, a military dictatorship
22. Id.
23. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 397.
24. See, e.g., SOURCES, supra note 19, at 396 (Records Concerning the Militia (1539-1577)).
25. Id. at 397 (Instructions for General Musters (1572)).
26. Id. at 396.
27. JOHN FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND, otherwise called THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND A LIMITED MONARCHY 114-15 (C. Plummer ed., rev. ed. 1885).
Fortescue saw Englishmen as healthy, wealthy, and well armed, "wherefore thai ben myghty, and
able to resiste the adversaries of this realme, and to beet oper resumes that do, or woldee do them
wronge. Lo, this is the fruty of Jus polliticum et regale, under which we live." Id.
28. In 1539, the French ambassador reported that "in Canterbury, and the other towns upon
the road, I found every English subject in arms who was capable of serving. Boys of 17 and 18
have been called out without exception of place or person ... " L. BOYNTON, THE ELIZABETHAN
MILITIA 8-9 (1967).
29. See generally 3 THOMAS BABBINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
ACCESSION OF JAMES THE SECOND 47 (1900) (1st ed. 1849) (discussing English acceptance of a
standing army by the end of the Tudor period).
30. See H. LASKI, THE RISE OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (1936); John V. Orth, North Carolina
Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1759, 1765 (1992).
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ruled, supremacy of the English Parliament over the crown was established, and
Parliament installed a new King and Queen and forced them to accede to a
Declaration of Rights.31 Throughout this period, various factions sought to
control the militia and intermittently to disarm opposing factions.32
James I, the first Stuart monarch, took the Crown in 1603. 33 An agitated
House of Commons immediately confronted him.' James had proclaimed that
individuals elected to Parliament could be seated only if certified by the
chancery; only proper men could be certified.3"
Parliament took the position that it would determine who should be
seated. 36 The relationship deteriorated, with James frequently asserting that
Kings hold their thrones by the will of God, not Parliament, and that to dispute
the King is blasphemy.37 James's position was that the King was the law and
all rights flowed from the King. Consequently, in 1621, James advised
Parliament that it existed only by the grace of the King."
Legal commentators and Parliament assessed the question of the King's
power differently. Lord Coke argued that the King's prerogative was limited
to what the law of land allowed him.39 Coke's view was that the law of
England was composed of only three parts: common law, statute, and
custom.' Consequently, the King had no power outside of these. Parliament
pointed out that its powers and liberties were "the ancient and undoubted
birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England. . . . "' James I tore the
page containing these words from the Journal of the Commons.
42
James's son Charles fared no better in his relations with Parliament. In
31. See THE PARLIAMENT OF WONDERS: COMMON DEBATES 1628 (Robert C. Johnson et al.
eds., 1977) [hereinafter PARLIAMENT].
32. Id.
33. For a general discussion of this area, see 8 SAMUEL R. GARDINER, HISTORY OF ENGLAND
FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR 1603-1642 (1965).
34. Id.
35. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 406-07.
36. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 412-13.
37. Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the
Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 966-67 (1975) (citing KING JAMES 1, THE
WORKES OF THE MOST HIGH AND MIGHTIE PRINCE JAMES 529, 531 (1616)).
38. Weatherup, supra note 37, at 967.
39. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 441.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 429.
42. Id.
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1628, Parliament enacted the Petition of Right. 3 This petition enumerated
Charles's violations of the rights of his subjects, including forced loans to the
Crown, imprisonment without process, quartering of soldiers in English homes
without the consent of the owner, and the execution of persons pursuant to
martial law." The King agreed to acknowledge his excesses because he
needed Parliament's assistance in raising revenues. Charles I thereafter
dissolved Parliament and refused to call new Parliaments for eleven years.
Charles I began developing his own army.' Charles attempted to raise
funds for additional military forces by writs or assessments on each
individual."7 In addition, ecclesiastical canons were added which advised
subjects that bearing arms against the King would result in damnation.'
Scotland went into open rebellion.
Charles I was forced to call Parliament to session in 1640 for purposes of
raising additional taxes because of the rebellion. 9 The new Parliament,
frequently called the Long Parliament because of its extended tenure,' seized
the opportunity to assert its influence to the detriment of the monarchy.
Parliament secured for itself the power of dissolving and eliminating the King's
prerogative courts.3 ' Additionally, Parliament demanded that Lord Strafford,
the King's leading minister, be removed from his post on the grounds that
Strafford had raised a standing army in Ireland. 2 The King complied;
Stratford was executed; and Ireland revolted.
Swelled with its success in outmaneuvering the King, the Long Parliament
moved to seize control of the militia."3 The King balked and refused to accede
to this demand. Parliament moved forward and appointed its own officers to
43. See Joyce A. McCray Pearson, The Federal and State Bill of Rights: A Historical Look at
the Relationship Between America's Documents of Individual Freedom, 1993 How. L.J. 43, 46
(discussing the second antecedent of the federal bill of rights).
44. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 450-52.
45. 2 HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 257 (J. Rushworth ed., 1721).
46. References to this army appear at SOURCES, supra note 19, at 490 (The Nineteen
Propositions, June 1, 1642, in which Parliament insisted on removal and discharge of the same).
47. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 455-56.
48. Weatherup, supra note 37, at 968.
49. Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 136 (1992)
(discussing Charles's reconvening Parliament in order to get an appropriation of money).
50. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Ideology and Incorporation III: Reason Regulated-The Post-
Restoration English Civilians, 1653-1735, 67 B.U. L. REV. 289, 301 (1987) (discussing the Long
Parliament).
51. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 479-81.
52. Id. at 477-78.
53. Id. at 486-87.
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take charge of the militia by passing the bill the King had refused to sign as an
Ordinance of Parliament in 1642. 4  Parliament called out the militia and
warned that militia units mustered under authority other than that of Parliament
would be punished.55 The King did the same, and civil war ensued.56
The actual ability of Parliament or the King to muster the militia is unclear.
Charles attempted to disarm many militia units by confiscating public magazines
and seizing the weapons of residents.57 In addition, Charles sought to arm
Catholics he had previously disarmed to secure their assistance.5" These acts
could be considered as evidence that Parliament was more successful at securing
the support of local militias than was Charles I. In any event, Parliament's
forces prevailed. Charles I was executed in 1649 and the Kingship and the
House of Lords were abolished. England was declared a free state.59
Parliament's declaration notwithstanding, England was not a free state. The
militia, mustered in 1642, became standing armies by 1649. After a period of
years, the citizen-soldiers no longer served as the need arose. Many were
unwilling to follow the dictates of Parliament. Parliament created its own army,
known as the "New Model Army" in 1645.' True to its roots, a large portion
of the army perceived that its loyalties lay with the people, not Parliament.
Several events fostered this perception. One event was Parliament's failure to
pay the soldiers. Other events included Parliament's favoring a national
Presbyterian church.6'
Many army leaders, including Oliver Cromwell, were advocates of religious
freedom. Those army leaders took the position that the English people's
freedom of worship was a right over which Parliament had no control. Thus,
part of the army, initially raised by Parliament, saw itself as an independent
political force empowered to act in the name of the people. The army,
increasingly subject to Cromwell's control, proposed an "Agreement of the
People," which excluded Parliament's power over religion, impressing men into
the army or navy, or requiring accused persons to incriminate themselves.62
Parliament rejected the "Agreement. "63
54. Id.
55. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 488.
56. Id. at 487.
57. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE
ORIGINS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 8-9 (1981).
58. Id. at 393-94.
59. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 523.
60. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 73 (1988).
61. Id. at 67.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. at 73 (citing 7 JOHN RUSHwORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 867-68 (1721)).
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Consequently, soldiers took an oath, called a "Solemn Engagement," to
remain together until their demands for back pay and political changes were
met.' The army defined Parliament's authority and dictated when it would
meet.' Subsequently, Parliament attempted to disband the army. The army
declined and eventually took over the government, installing the Rump
Parliament.' When a subsequent Parliament attempted to disband the army,
it was dissolved.67 Ultimately, another Parliament bestowed on Cromwell the
role of Lord Protector.' This Parliament also attempted to reduce the army's
size and revitalize the militia.' Cromwell, however, dissolved Parliament and
created a military government. Segments of the army, paid regularly by the
government, were assigned to each of eleven military districts.' Cromwell's
army was authorized to disarm all Catholics, opponents of the government, and
anyone else judged dangerous.71 When Cromwell died in 1659, the Rump
Parliament met again and enacted laws that empowered government officials to
confiscate arms from landowners to protect the Commonwealth.' Shortly
thereafter, legislation was passed authorizing the seizure of arms from Catholics,
anyone who had borne arms against Parliament, or anyone else judged to be
dangerous to the State.'
In 1660, the army intervened and General George Monk reinstated
members of Parliament who had been purged in 1648 because they favored the
monarchy. 4 Parliament then restored the monarchy by placing Charles II, the
executed King's son, on the throne. Charles II was in an uncomfortable
position. He had no army. His father was executed after the Civil War.
Because of the policy of universal armament and the Civil War, the English
people were heavily armed. Cromwell's army of 60,000 was mingled with the
rest of the population. Consequently, Charles II decided to develop his own
army and to disarm the population.75
64. MORGAN, supra note 60, at 74.
65. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 507 (citing THE HEADS OF THE PROPOSALS (1647)).
66. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 17, at 573.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 45 (1984); DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT (1986).
72. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 17, at 574 (citing ORDINANCES AND ACTS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECrORATE 1317 (London 1911)).
73. Id.
74. MORGAN, supra note 60, at 94.
75. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309, 321 (1991).
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Charles II disbanded the army except for troops he believed would be loyal
to his government.' Parliament assisted by enacting the Militia Act of 1661
which vested control over the militia in the King.' Charles II began molding
a militia loyal to the throne by directing that his officer corp assemble volunteers
for separate training and "disaffected persons. . . not allowed to assemble and
their arms seized."' In 1662, the more select militia was authorized to seize
arms of anyone judged dangerous to the Kingdom.79 In addition, gunsmiths
were ordered to report weekly on the number of guns made and sold;
importation of firearms was banned."
A move toward total disarmament occurred with passage of the Game Act
of 1671.8 The Game Act dramatically limited the right to hunt to those
persons who earned over £100 annual income from the land.' More
importantly, and unlike any prior game act, it made possession of a firearm by
other than those qualified to hunt illegal and provided for confiscation of those
arms. 83
Charles II's successor, his brother James, pursued the disarmament.
James, however, was the object of suspicion because he was Catholic. As King,
James was also the official head of the Anglican Church. He sat on the throne
of a country that barred Catholics from holding appointed office.84
James was challenged only a few months after taking the throne by Charles
II's illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, who proclaimed himself as the
Savior of Anglicanism.' James crushed the rebellion and, in doing so,
doubled his standing army to 30,000 men.86 He used his kingly "dispensing
power," which permits kings to make an occasional exception to the law, to
appoint Catholic officers to enter his army. James quartered his new troops in
private homes in violation of Parliamentary enactments. The populace thus
became suspicious of whether James might plan to impose his religion on
76. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 17, at 574.
77. SouRcEs, supra note 19, at 541.
78. 8 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS (DOMESTIC), Charles II, No. 188, at 150 (July 1660).
79. See J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MIITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 10 (1965).
80. Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law
Tradition, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 285, 299-300 (1983) [hereinafter Malcolm, Tradition].
81. 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 25 (1671).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. SouRcEs, supra note 19, at 555.
85. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 17, at 577.
86. Weatherup, supra note 37, at 140.
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England."'
James continued disarmament by enforcing it in Ireland. The common
perception was that James was disarming Protestants in Ireland and the new
Whig party that opposed him. James then asked Parliament to repeal the test
acts that precluded Catholics from holding office, to suspend the Habeas Corpus
Act, and to abandon the militia concept in favor of standing armies."s
Parliament refused.
James responded by having his Judges find that the laws of England were
the King's laws and the King could dispense with them." The King replaced
Protestants with Catholics at high government posts, including the military; he
then placed 13,000 men of his army outside London.' In 1688, James's son-
in-law, William of Orange, a Protestant, landed in England with a large Dutch
army. James's army deserted him and he fled to France.
William and Mary became sovereigns in 1689. Parliament restricted their
powers by adopting the Declaration of Rights.9 William and Mary were
required to accept the rights enumerated in the Declaration as the rights of their
subjects and to rule in accordance with Parliament's statutes. 92  The
Declaration recited the abuses by James, including the raising and keeping of a
standing army without Parliament's consent, quartering of troops in private
homes, and disarming Protestant subjects. The declaration set forth the positive
right of Protestant subjects to have arms for their defense, suitable to their
conditions, and as allowed by law. 9'
The Declaration did not create a new right. The English had been able to
possess individual arms for centuries and at times were required to keep them.
Nevertheless, the debates attending the Declaration make clear that Parliament
thought the right should be recognized as a right of individuals. The Whigs in
the Convention Parliament were the most outspoken in favor of the right to
87. For example, King James II tried to force the Church of England's clergy to support his
policy of religious tolerance and to read his Declaration of Indulgence from their pulpits. The
Archbishop of Canterbury and six other bishops petitioned the King against the use of his dispensing
power. King James had them charged with seditious libel. The jury acquitted, and the public
endorsed the result. Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 289, 330-31 (1966).
88. Id.
89. See SOURCES, supra note 19, at 583; Godden v. Hales, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1686).
90. Weatherup, supra note 37, at 141.
91. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 599.
92. Id. at 606.
93. Id. at 601.
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possess arms to resist tyranny.' The members were aggrieved that the King
and a prior Parliament had attempted to, and did, disarm some of the English
subjects.95 An early draft of the grievance portion of the Declaration recited
that "the Acts concerning the militia are grievous to the subjects,"" a reference
to those portions of the civil war era militia acts that permitted the militia to
disarm those suspected of disloyalty.
To address this grievance, the draft stating the positive right first provided:
"[I]t is necessary for the Publick Safety, that the Subjects which are Protestants,
should provide and keep Arms for their common Defence. And that the Arms
which have been seized, and taken from them, be restored."' This version
stated a collective purpose for the right, public safety, and common defense.
A second version followed that deleted the reference to the public safety but
retained the collective purpose language: common defense. It altered the
"should keep" language to "may keep." This version read, "Mhat the
Subjects, which are Protestants, may provide and keep Arms, for their common
Defence. ""
The final version came after a compromise with the House of Lords. A
prior Parliament, during the civil war era, had not only permitted its militia, a
collective organization, to disarm others, but had also abolished the House of
Lords. The House of Lords apparently objected to the "collective purpose"
language in the Commons draft. It secured new language that completely
eliminated the collective purpose-common defense language." The complete
text, on this point, as adopted, reads "[T]hat the subjects which are Protestants
may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by
law."' 00
Several other points are important regarding this article of the declaration.
First, the language that Protestant subjects may have arms "as allowed by law"
was not construed as a limitation on possession, but rather a limitation on
94. Malcolm, Tradition, supra note 80, at 307.
95. The Declaration of Rights contained as its fifth and sixth charges against James II the
assertion that he had attempted "to subvert" the "[liaws and [Il]iberties" by "raising and keeping a
Standing army . . . in time of peace" and "[bly causing several good Subjects, being Protestants,
to be disarmed at the same Time when Papists were both armed and employed contrary to Law."
The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
96. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FROM DEC. 26, 1688 TO OCT. 26, 1693, at 21-22
(London 1742) (Lib. of Congress Rare Books Collection)).
97. Malcolm, Tradition, supra note 80, at 307 (citing 10 H.C. JOUR., 1688-93, at 21-22).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
100. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 601.
1018
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use.'' Parliament enacted a new game or hunting act that deleted firearms
from the list of hunting equipment that could not be possessed except by the
wealthy. " Arms could be confiscated if used to poach game, but possession
of arms was protected as a matter of right. °3 However, the phrase "as
allowed by law" highlights that what Parliament giveth, Parliament could take
away. With or without the phrase, Parliament's Declaration of Rights only
protected those rights from abuse by the monarchy. In 1689, like today, the
non-constitutional English system permits the current Parliament to abrogate the
rights granted by a prior Parliament.
Second, the English Declaration of Rights states "that the subjects which
are Protestants may have arms." 104 However, contemporaneous legislation in
1689 made clear that while Catholics were not permitted to stockpile weapons,
they were allowed to possess arms for defense of their house or person.'05
Last, although the Declaration speaks solely in terms of an individual right to
bear arms, a review of eighteenth-century literature indicates that the intended
purpose was to provide both an individual and a collective right with the
collective right being the more important."° A true collective right, however,
could only be protected by guaranteeing the individual right.
Two points should be addressed on this issue. First, during the civil war
era and thereafter, both Parliament and the monarchy had proclaimed
themselves, to the exclusion of the other, as the protector of the subjects' well-
being. To facilitate the collective rights of the subjects, each had attempted to
disarm the others' supporters. Thus, the collective organization intended to
protect all subjects' liberty, the militia, became an instrument of governmental
tyranny. The collective rights of all subjects could not be guaranteed if the
government had the power to vest enforcement in one collective organization
because the government controlled the organization. Accordingly, the
government's power to appoint the officers of the militia and select its
membership meant that the militia could become an instrument of the
government, not the people. Thus, the people's collective rights were
enforceable only if the power of enforcement, force of arms, was universally
dispersed.
101. 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
102. Malcolm, Tradition, supra note 80, at 309 (citing 4 & 5 W. & M., ch. 23 (1692)).
103. Id. at 311 (citing Rex v. Gardner, Strange, 2 REPORTS 1098, 93 Eng. Rep. 1056 (K.B.
1739)).
104. SOURCES, supra note 19, at 601 ("Bill of Rights").
105. Malcolm, Tradition, supra note 80, at 309 (citing 1 W. & M., ch. 15 (1689)).
106. See HALBROOK, supra note 71.
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Ill. THE ENGLISH THEORISTS
Accordingly, when Blackstone spoke of the rights of persons, he defined
such rights as being either: 1) absolute, that is belonging to the person whether
out of society or in it; or 2) relative, meaning the right is an incident of
membership in society."m Blackstone described the right to keep arms as
absolute or belonging to the individual, but ascribed both public and private
purposes to the right. The public purpose was resistance to restrain the violence
of oppression; the private was self-preservation." Blackstone described this
right as necessary to secure the actual enjoyment of other rights which would
otherwise be in vain if protected only by the dead letter of the laws. ,"e
In addition to Blackstone, the views of other seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century English political theorists clearly influenced the political views of the
colonists who ultimately would revolt and establish a new nation. e American
political thought was strongly linked to "republican" thought in England."'
The essence of republican thought was that a citizenry could rule itself without
the paternal guiding hand of a monarch."
2
One of the leading republican theorists was James Harrington."3
Harrington's beliefs were simple and direct. He believed that ownership of land
gave people independence.' This independence would cultivate rights now
107. COMMENTARIES, supra note 8, at *88.
108. Id. at 144.
109. Id. at *140-41.
110. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
111. See JOHN G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 462-552 (1975); CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT,
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II
UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES 385 (1959); Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism
and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334, 334-37 (1982).
112. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 18-19
(1972).
113. See generally POCOCK, supra note 111 (tracing republican thought from Aristotle to
Machiavelli and Florentine political theory, to James Harrington and the English civic humanists,
to the eighteenth century's Radical Whigs, and, ultimately to the American Founders). For an in-
depth analysis of Harrington's political thought, see THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON
(John G.A. Pocock ed., 1977).
114. See generally JAMES HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES HARRINOTON, supra note 113, at 170 (explaining that the way to mediate security
of property with widespread civic participation was to redistribute property, especially non-feudal,
"allodial" interest in land, broadly within society so that citizenship, and the opportunity to
participate, would be widely available). Not all republicans, however, held egalitarian property
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considered fundamental, including the right of self-government. Harrington also
believed that the actual independence attained would be a function of the
citizen's ability to bear arms and use them to defend his rights." 5 He sought
support from the works of Machiavelli, who proclaimed that there was a direct
relationship between good arms and good laws.16
A central thesis of Harrington's republican theory is that an armed
population is a popular government's best protection against its enemies, both
foreign and domestic. 117 While Harrington and subsequent republicans argued
the virtue of armed citizenry, they warned that standing armies were to be
avoided at almost all cost because such armies become the government's
instrument to retain power."' Rather, a populace that possessed the land and
arms inevitably would retain political power as well as serving as the best
defense against the popular government's enemies.
These views became tenets of early republican or whig political theorists
during the eighteenth century." 9 Henry Neville argued that by arming the
people, democracies could obtain incomparable advantage over neighboring
aristocracies because the aristocracies could not arm their populace for fear they
would seize the government." Robert Molesworth praised the armed and
free Swiss, as well as his own brethren, the English, as examples of the virtue
of arming the people as individuals. 2 '
distribution notions. Fora discussion of elitist aspects of republicanism, see, e.g., Hendrick Hartog,
Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1987); Frank I. Michelman,
Possession v. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987).
115. THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON, supra note 113.
116. NICCOLO MACHIAVELIU, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 44 (Luigi Ricci trans., Mod.
Lib. ed. 1950) (1513).
117. See JAMES HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES HARRINGTON:
REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 74 (Charles Blitzer ed., 1955).
118. MORGAN, supra note 60, at 157.
119. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); POCOCK, supra note 111, at 462-552; ROBBINS, supra note 109, at 385. Although these
historians are all part of a common movement, there do exist significant differences in the ways they
view republicanism. See Shalhope, supra note 111, at 334-37.
120. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 17, at 585 (citing CRISTOPHER HILL, SOME
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 27 (1980)).
121. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 17, at 589 (citing FRANCOIS HOTMAN, FRANCOR
CALLIA at iv (R. Molesworth trans., London 1711)).
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IV. THE POLITICS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
The English republican views on the relationship between arms and
democracy profoundly influenced the views of the founding fathers."x Both
the Federalists, those promoting a strong central government, and the
Antifederal-ists, those believing that liberties including the right of self-rule
would be protected best by preservation of local autonomy, agreed that arms and
liberty were inextricably linked."
The first discussion in which these views were articulated occurred in the
context of Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution concerning the powers of
Congress to raise a standing army and its power over the militia. As initially
proposed, Congress was to be provided the power to raise armies. "
Objections were raised that there was no check against standing armies in time
of peace. "u The debate focused on how to avoid the dangers of a standing
army; there was no dispute that a standing army posed a significant threat to the
liberty of the people." The dilemma was that some type of national army
would be necessary in time of war, but the results of waiting until war occurred
to raise a national army could be disastrous. 27
The solution adopted was two-fold. First, Congress would have the power
to raise an army but no appropriation of money for that use could be for more
122. The Founding Fathers were influenced by the fact that the entire body of republican
philosophy known to them was based on English and classical history, which taught that popular
possession of arms was vital to the preservation of liberty and a republican form of government.
See Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendnment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599
(1982).
123. The unanimity with which Federalists and Antifederalists supported an individual right to
bear arms is a reflection of their shared philosophical and historical heritage. The unanimity in the
contemporary understanding of the Second Amendment helps explain the relative absence of
recorded debate over it. What little debate there is appears at 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778-80 (J. Gales
ed., 1834) and relates to James Madison's proposal that the amendment provide that "no person
religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Id.
124. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16. In these clauses, Congress may "declare War,...
raise support Armies .... provide and maintain a Navy; ... make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . . provide for calling forth the Militia . . . provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . ." See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 301 (1983) (stating that the framers of the Constitution clearly contemplated that Congress have
plenary authority over creation and maintenance of military).
125. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 560 (Dept. of State, 1900), reprinted in
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786-1870,
at 560 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1965).
126. Id. at 560, 599, 677, 746.
127. For a discussion of the debate concerning the military at the Constitutional Convention,
see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 80-97, 345-46 (1957).
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than two years.'" s Because the people controlled the House of Representatives
and the Senate, and Congress controlled the purse, the people were given an
effective check against the dangers of a standing army. The second check
against the dangers of a standing army was provided by the existence of the
militia. Again, however, the necessity of providing for the common defense had
to be satisfied while guarding against the national government's abuse of power.
If the danger of a standing army was to be limited, the militia, which was
then under the control of the states, must be available to meet national
emergencies until an adequate standing army could be raised. Thus, the national
government needed the power to call upon the militia. Conversely, the existence
of a militia independent of federal control was deemed necessary as a check on
the standing army which Congress was authorized to raise.'" The resolution
was to provide Congress with the power to organize, arm, and discipline the
militia and to govern such parts as may be called into federal service, but to
reserve to the states the appointment of officers and actual training of the
militia.J" The drafters of this particular language hastened to point out that
the power to organize, arm, and discipline was intended only to allow Congress
to prescribe the proportion of men to officers, specify the kind and size of arms,
ensure that men were armed in fact either by themselves, the states, or by
Congress, and to prescribe exercises. "' The States were to be in control of
the militia by reason of the power to appoint officers and provide for the actual
training. 32 The national government would be in control of the militia only
when the militia was called out for national service and, even then, would have
to rely on the State appointed officers to execute its orders.
A. The Antifederalist View
Additional views on the relationship between freedom and arms were
expressed when the Constitution was being submitted to the states for
ratification. The Antifederalist views were stated in pamphlets entitled Letters
128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
129. Akhil Amar argues that the Second Amendment also provides a linguistic gloss on
Congress's Article I military powers. An army constituted hired soldiers, unlike a militia that
consisted of the general public. Consequently, Congress's power to raise an "army" involves
authority to enlist soldiers, not conscript them. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 reserves to the states "the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
131. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 386 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
132. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 16 reserves "to the States respectively" the power to appoint
the officers of any militia for which Congress might provide and to conduct the "training [of] the
militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
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from the Federal Farmer to the Republican.133 Richard Henry Lee is credited
with authorship."3 The self-styled federal farmer thought of himself as a
supporter of federalism and republicanism. 35 His view of federalism was not
that set forth in the proposed Constitution of 1787. The federal farmer argued
that a distant national government was antithetical to freedom:
[T]he general government, far removed from the people, and none of
its members elected oftener than once in two years, will be forgot or
neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded, unless a multitude
of officers and military force be continually kept in view, and
employed to enforce the execution of the laws and to make the
government feared and respected. No position can be truer than this,
that in this country either neglected laws, or a military execution of
them, must lead to revolution, and to the destruction of freedom.
Neglected laws must first lead to anarchy and confusion; and a
military execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same point-
despotic government.
136
The federal farmer also saw evil in Congress's power to raise an army,
despite the two-year limit on money appropriations and the states' control over
the militia via the appointment of officers. 137  He understood the need to
provide for the common defense but believed an additional check was necessary.
He proposed requiring two-thirds consent in Congress before a standing army
could be raised or the militia could be pressed into service by the national
government." Additionally, the federal farmer argued that a select militia
composed of less than all the people ought to be avoided. The farmer argued
that, to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always
possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them. 139
Another Antifederalist, George Mason, spoke on the relationship between
133. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN (V. Bennett ed., 1978)
[hereinafter FEDERAL FARMER].
134. The true author of the Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican is unknown.
The traditional view is that Richard Henry Lee of Virginia was the author. Steven R. Boyd argues
that the overwhelming contemporary opinion was that Lee was indeed the "Federal Farmer." See
Steven R. Boyd, Impact of the Constitution on State Politics: New York as a Test Case, in THE
HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF NATION MAKING 270, 276 n.14 (J. Martin ed., 1976).
135. Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERAiiST251 (H. Storing ed., 1981).
136. FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 133, at 13.
137. For Antifederalist attacks on standing armies, see, e.g., Essays by a [jMaryland] Farmer,
in 5 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 22-28 (1981).
138. Id. at 21-22.
139. Id. at 124.
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arms and liberty. Mason asserted that history had demonstrated that the most
effective way to enslave a people is to disarm them. " Mason suggested that
divine providence had given every individual the right of self-defense, clearly
including the right to defend one's political liberty within that term. 4'
Patrick Henry argued against ratification of the Constitution by Virginia,
in part because the Constitution permitted a standing army and gave the federal
government some control over the militia. 42 Henry objected to the lack of
any clause forbidding disarmament of individual citizens; "the great object is
that every man be armed . . . . Everyone who is able may have a gun."
43
The Antifederalists believed that governmental tyranny was the primary evil
against which the people had to defend in creating a new Constitution. To
preserve individual rights against such tyranny, the Antifederalists argued for the
addition of a Bill of Rights which included, among other rights, the right to keep
and bear arms. "
B. The Federalist View
The Federalists, those supporting the Constitution as drafted, did not
dispute the premise that governmental tyranny was the primary evil that people
had to guard against.'45 Nor did the Federalists dispute the nexus between
140. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792, at 1075 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
141. Id. at 1075, 1076.
142. Speeches by Patrick Henry Before the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 5 & 7, 1788),
reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERAIiST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 199-
216 (Ralph L. Ketcham ed., 1986).
143. Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the SecondAmendment,
82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 229 (1983).
144. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
145. Madison warned that the greatest danger to the constitutional order and to the liberty of
the citizen was not the possibility of a tyrant President, which he regarded as slight, but the risk that
Congress would take over the powers of the other two branches of government. "The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands," Madison wrote, "may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 329 (James Madison)
(Tudor Publishing Co. 1937). Power "is of an encroaching nature," and something more than
"parchment barriers" is required to restrict it "from passing the limit assigned to it." Id., No. 48,
at 321. The risk of congressional power is great, far greater than the risk from the President or the
courts. Congress "alone has access to the pockets of the people." Id. at 321, 323. Its supposed
influence over the people is an inducement to act, and it can expand its power in many ways,
masking its encroachments "under complicated and indirect measures." Id. at 323. Madison
concluded that "it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions." Id.
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arms and freedom." In one of the first Federalist pamphlets, Noah Webster
argued that the proposed Constitution provided adequate guarantees to check the
dangers of any standing army.'47 His reasoning acknowledged checks and
balances, but did not rely on the same. Rather, Webster argued:
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they
are in almost every Kingdom of Europe. The Supreme power in
America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole
body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any
bands of regular troops than can be, on any pretense, raised in the
United States. '48
Similarly, James Madison made clear that, although the proposed
Constitution offered sufficient guarantees against despotism by its checks and
balances, the real deterrent to governmental abuse was the armed
population. 49 To the Antifederalist criticism of the standing army as a threat
to liberty, Madison replied:
To these [the standing army] would be opposed a militia amounting to
near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by
men chosen from amongst themselves, fighting for their common
liberties, and united and conducted by government possessing their
affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia
thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of
regular troops . ... Besides the advantage of being armed, which
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the
existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are
146. WILLIAM H. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 125-26 (2d ed. 1829). Alexander
Hamilton saw the people's possession of arms as guaranteeing freedom from state as well as from
federal tyranny. The armed populace, "by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly
make it preponderate" against either a federal or a state invasion of popular rights. THE FEDERALIST
No. 28, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864).
147. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 27 (Comm. Print 1982).
148. NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA 43 (Philadelphia
1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE: 1787-1788, at 5 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1888).
149. At the convention, James Madison remarked:
As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard
[against] it by sufficient powers to the Common Govt. and as the greatest danger to
liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent them, by an effectual
provision for a good Militia.
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 600 (Gouverneur
Morris) (Ohio Univ. Press rev. ed. 1984).
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attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a
barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than
any which a simple government of any form can admit of."5
Another leading Federalist, Alexander Hamilton, voiced a similar view. 51
Hamilton suggested that if the representations of the people, elected under the
proposed Constitution, betrayed their constituents, the people retained the right
to defend their political rights and possessed the means to do so.
152
In summary, both Federalists and Antifederalists believed that the main
danger to the republic was tyrannical government and the ultimate check on
tyrannical government was an armed population. 53  Federalists and Anti-
federalists disagreed, however, on several issues. First, they disagreed as to
whether sufficient checks and balances had been placed on the proposed national
government to control the danger of oppression.' 5' Second, the Antifederalists
believed a bill of rights should be incorporated into the Constitution to guarantee
certain rights. 55 The Federalists argued that such a bill of rights was
unnecessary because the power of the federal government was restricted to the
grant of authority provided by the Constitution. 56 There was no need to
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 310, 311 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
151. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION (Richard B. Morris ed.,
1957).
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
153. See supra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
154. The Antifederalist warnings of inevitable doom, which would follow granting the central
government an army power, were neutralized by a Federalist-proposed system of checks and
balances that would prevent the army from usurping the power of the elected government and
oppressing the people. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention
of Pennsylvania to their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERAUST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 254-56 (R. Ketcham ed., 1986). The minority
feared that:
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of the
people, may be a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed
to enforce the collection of the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the
most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man who may have the army at his devotion,
may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute power.
Id. at 254.
The Federalists advanced the contrary view, including Alexander Hamilton who argued that
if the central government was denied an army power then future generations would be unable to
adequately protect themselves. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
155. See 1 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WHAT THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 64-70, 72 (1981) (discussing the debate between Federalists and Anti-
federalists over whether a constitution that based government on republican principles needed a bill
of rights to protect individual liberties).
156. Id.
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provide exceptions to powers not granted.157  Further, the Federalists argued
that providing exceptions to powers not granted was dangerous because it could
encourage a claim that powers not expressly stated had been granted.'
Again, both sides not only agreed that the people had a right to be armed, both
sides assumed the existence of an armed population as an essential element to
preserving liberty. The framers quite clearly had adopted James Harrington's
political theory that the measure of liberty attained and retained was a direct
function of an armed citizenry's ability to claim and hold those rights from
domestic and foreign enemies. 59
V. THE RATIFICATION PROCESS
The Federalist and Antifederalist pamphlets were written to influence the
ratification process by which the proposed Constitution would become
effective."W In addition to revealing the drafters' political philosophy, the
pamphlets and other documents intended to influence ratification reveal
additional concerns with the right to bear arms.' Antifederalists rejected the
claim that the militia would serve as a deterrent to the threat posed by a standing
army. 62 The responsive argument widely made was that Congress might be
able to confine the existing militia force, all armed citizens, to a select militia
made up of a small segment of the population. 3 Baron Von Steuben,
157. Washington advised Lafayette: "There was not a member of the Convention, I believe,
who had the least objection to what is contended for by the Advocates for a Bill of Rights ... 
3 RECORDs, supra note 131, at 297-98.
158. THE FEDERALiST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
159. See supra notes 113-21.
160. See PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (1987).
161. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24 (1957) ("Their fears were rooted in history. They knew
that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders.").
162. Instead of a standing army providing for the nation's defense, the Antifederalists advocated
the use of a well-regulated militia maintained by each state. These militia would be under the state
governor's control but subject to requisition by the national government in time of need. The
prevailing sentiment was that:
The standing army with its upper-class officers and lower-class enlisted men was
basically an aristocratic institution. It was associated with the British Crown and with
European despotism. It was quite unnecessary in the eyes of many Americans. The
distance of the United States from Europe meant that it required no permanent military
force with the possible exception of small frontier garrisons to deal with the Indians.
Consequently, it was generally agreed that primary reliance must be put on a citizen
militia composed of part-time officers and enlisted men.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 127, at 166-67.
163. Virginia's Richard Henry Lee argued that select militia might be used to disarm the
population and that, in any event, it would pose more of a danger to individual liberty than a militia
composed of the whole population. He charged that a select militia "commit[s] the many to the
mercy [and thel prudence of the few." Richard Henry Lee, LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER:
LETTER III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS229 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966).
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Washington's Inspector General, had already proposed such a force."' The
fear was that creation of a select militia, armed by and loyal to the federal
government, would be accompanied by disarmament of the people in general.
A. The State Conventions
All of the arguments for and against ratification came to bear in the state
conventions." In New York, Hamilton advocated adopting the Constitution
and amending it, if necessary.'" Hamilton's argument was that if
amendments were to be made, they ought to be made after adoption since an
alteration would constitute a new proposal and must undergo a new decision in
each state. 7
Hamilton's argument prevailed. New York ratified the Constitution, but
it included with the ratification statement a declaration of rights and a statement
that ratification was made with the assumption that the rights enumerated in the
declaration could not be abridged or violated and were consistent with the
Constitution.'" Accordingly, New York ratified, but made clear that the
people had a right to keep and bear arms and that the militia was to include all
the people capable of bearing arms, not just a select few.
Similarly, New Hampshire ratified the Constitution but stated:
It is the Opinion of this Convention that certain amendments &
alteration in the said Constitution would remove the fears and quiet the
apprehensions of many of the good people of this State & more
effectually guard against an undue Administration of the Federal
Government-The Convention do therefore recommend that the
164. See RUDOLF CRONAU, THE ARMY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND ITS ORGANIZER
(1923).
165. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913).
166. The Federalist Papers, a collection of some 85 newspaper essays, was written between
October 1787 and May 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to persuade the
New York state ratifying convention to adopt the Constitution. A standard critical edition in use
today is THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
167. For example, in THE FEDERALIST No. 23, Publius addressed the need to adopt a
constitution "at least equally energetic with the one proposed," relying upon the "[d]efective" nature
of the Articles of Confederation. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 143, 146 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Modem Library ed. 1941). The argument was frequently reiterated. See id. No. 15, at 93
(Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 22, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 26, at 164-65 (Alexander
Hamilton).
168. See I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEPHIA, IN
1787, at 327-31 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter STATE DEBATES]
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following alterations & provisions be introduced into the said
Constitution.
Twelfth
Congress shall never disarm any citizen unless such as are or have
been in Actual Rebellion.169
In Pennsylvania, James Wilson argued against adding a bill of rights on
grounds already offered by Madison," that such an enumeration was
unnecessary and indeed dangerous since no person could enumerate all the rights
of men.' 7' Pennsylvania ratified, but a substantial minority drafted a series
of proposed amendments that included the following:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and their own State or the United States, or for the purpose
of killing game; and no law shall be passed disarming the people or
any of them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public
injury from individuals."n
It is doubtful that the Pennsylvania minority was attempting to constitutionalize
hunting as a sport. "7 Rather, the delegates were attempting to eliminate the
possibility that game laws, used effectively in England at different points to
disarm the population, would not produce a similar result in America.
Samuel Adams made similar arguments in Massachusetts. 74  The
argument that adoption must precede amendment prevailed. 7 ' In Virginia,
Madison secured ratification, but George Mason, Patrick Henry, and Richard
Henry Lee were successful in having the convention adopt a Declaration of
Rights which was to be recommended to the First Congress for adoption as
constitutional amendments.7 6 The right of the people to keep and bear arms
169. See DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES, H.R. DoC. NO. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1007 (1927).
170. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 168, at 626-27; 2 STATE DEBATES, supra note 168, at 436.
171. The classic formulations of the mischief feared by inclusion of a bill of rights are found
in the speech by James Wilson before the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 270-72 (1988).
172. PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIII.
173. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665
(1975).
174. Id. at 675.
175. Id.
176. See William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal
History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 36 (1992) (discussing the unusual alignment in Virginia where liberals
like Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee joined forces with conservatives like
George Mason to promote a bill of rights). The Virginia Proposals for a bill of rights were drafted
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/5
1994] SECOND AMENDMENT 1031
was included as was the statement that a militia composed of the body of the
people was the natural and safe defense of a free state.
177
North Carolina's convention proposed that a declaration of rights be added
to the Constitution which explicitly identified the right of people to keep and
bear arms as a natural right and one of the means necessary to the pursuit and
obtainment of happiness and safety."~ Identification of the right was
accompanied by the statement that the militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the natural and safe defense of a free state."7 The
North Carolina convention refused to ratify the Constitution until the document
included this and other rights." ° North Carolina did not ratify the Constitution
until the Bill of Rights was drafted and submitted to the States.' Rhode
Island followed an identical course by identifying the right of the people to keep
and bear arms as a natural right, among others, and declining to ratify the
Constitution until after the Bill of Rights had been drafted and submitted.182
To summarize the state ratification process, three states, New York, New
Hampshire, and Virginia, ratified while expressing their understanding that the
people had a right to bear arms and that Congress would never disarm law
abiding citizens. 83 Two states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, refused to
ratify until individual rights, including the people's right to keep and bear arms,
by a committee that included Antifederalists Lee and Mason, as well as Federalists James Madison,
John Marshall, and George Wythe.
177. The Virginia convention urged the adoption of the following language:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defence for a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty,
and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the
community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict
subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 168, at 659.
178. N.C. Proposal for a Declaration of Rights, § 19, in 4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 168,
at 244.
179. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVII.
180. In August 1788, the North Carolina Convention refused to ratify the Constitution by a
greater than two to one majority. The vote is recorded in 4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 151, at
250-51. North Carolina did not ratify until November 1789. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL
OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-88, at
250-51 (1966).
181. Id.
182. See I STATE DEBATES, supra note 168, at 331-37.
183. See Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right
to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 31 (1984).
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were recognized by amendments.' 84 In Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, an
effort was made to amend or condition ratification on amendment to include,
among others, the right to keep and bear arms.'85 Efforts to amend were
defeated but not on the merits. There is no evidence from any state convention
that any speaker suggested that the proposed Constitution would permit
disarming the public.
B. The Framers' Views of the States and Their Role
As discussed earlier, one of the disputes between the Federalists and
Antifederalists related to the relative strength that ought to be given to the
central government. Prior to adoption of the Constitution, the country was ruled
by the Articles of Confederation.'86 These articles preserved the autonomy of
the individual states and provided little power to the central government.187
The proposed Constitution altered this balance in favor of the central
government. The proposed change provoked substantial discourse."n In
recent times, the Antifederalists have been called states' rights proponents as a
consequence of their position that the proposed Constitution provided too much
power to the central government, with too few checks, at the expense of the
states. 189
This label-states' rights proponents-is inaccurate and misleading.
Federalists and Antifederalists feared governmental tyranny by all
governments-state and federal. The framers of the Constitution, particularly
the Antifederalists, were not attempting to preserve states' rights. They were
attempting to preserve the people's rights by maintaining local autonomy in the
form of the various state governments.
The Antifederalists relied extensively on the works of Baron de
184. See Patrick Conley, First in War, Last in Peace: Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786-
1790, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE
FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 276-85 (Patrick Conley & John P.
Kaminsky eds., 1988).
185. See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights:
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 VT. L. REv. 255 (1985).
186. The United States expanded its rulers' powers when it adopted the Constitution in place
of the Articles of Confederation. See GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77 (12th ed. 1991).
187. See Harold G. Maier, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign
Affairs. Distribution of Constitutional Authority: Preemption of State Law: A Recommended
Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832 (1989).
188. JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1781-1788
(1961).
189. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1452
(1987).
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Montesquieu to support the proposition that the geographic size of an area
strongly influenced its form of government.1" Montesquieu had written that
democracy could survive only in a small-sized state, small enough to permit the
actual participation of the people in government and small enough so that each
citizen understands that promoting the public good directly promotes the
individual.' 9' A middle-sized territory, as Montesquieu terms it, would
inevitably become a monarchy; to an extensive territory, a despotic form of
government was best adapted. In large republics, the public good is sacrificed
to a multiplicity of views and the citizens do not perceive the nexus between
promoting the public good and their individual welfare.
According to Montesquieu, a middle-sized territory would tend to become
a monarchy because ambitious persons who do not perceive the public good as
beneficial to them seek grandeur by imposing their will on others. One person
eventually prevails and assumes the role as prince. The monarchy then exists
through a system of honor established by giving perks and titles. If the territory
is too large, one person cannot command sufficient allegiance on honor of
enough of the populace to control the territory. Ruling a large territory requires
more than a system of titles and perks. Order can be maintained only by
immediate, passive obedience to the rules; passive obedience can be achieved
only by an instilling fear. The multiplicity of views, the dissents, are stifled by
fear. According to Montesquieu, rule by fear, despotism, was a logical incident
of the government of a large territory. Montesquieu's theory continued that
while a small republic could internally maintain its republican character, it
would be destroyed by foreign forces."2 The dilemma could be resolved only
by a confederate republic, a form of government in which small states become
individual members of an association which is able to provide security for the
whole body. 93
The Antifederalists used Montesquieu's well-known works to argue for a
less powerful central government and more autonomy for the individual states,
a government which would more closely resemble the Articles of Confederation
model and Montesquieu's confederate republic rather than that proposed by the
Constitution. Antifederalist publications confirm that preserving the autonomy
of the states was a means to the end of protecting the people's rights, not an end
190. Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) was a French political philosopher who classified
various forms of government and their attributes. His ideas were well-regarded by the Americans;
Jefferson once wrote that in economics, Adam Smith is generally recommended, in politics and
government, Montesquieu's treatises held equal stature. "To Mr. Thomas Mann Randolph, New
York, May 30, 1790," in 8 THE WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 31 (Memorial ed. 1903).
191. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. VIII, ch. 16, at 176 (David W. Carrithers ed.,
1977).
192. Id. at bk. IX, ch. 1, p. 183.
193. Id.
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in itself. In arguing against the new Constitution, the Pennsylvania Minority
framed the question-"Is it probable that the dissolution of the state
governments, and the establishment of one consolidated empire would be eligible
in its nature, and satisfactory to the people in its administration?" "
The answer - "I think not, as ... so extensive a territory could not be
governed, connected and preserved, but by the supremacy of
despotic power."' 95
The reason - Being "satiated with the blessings of liberty" after "asserting
their inalienable rights against foreign despots at the expense
of so much blood and treasure," the people will spurn the
shackles prepared for them under the new Constitution and
confirm their liberties.19
Although the complaint was the dissolution of state governments, the problem
was viewed as a loss of the people's rights.
In another publication, an unidentified Pennsylvania Antifederalist, writing
under the pen name Montezuma, purported to be an advocate of the Constitution
and to give the "inside story" of the dark designs of the proponents.
Montezuma suggested:
We have taken pains to leave the legislatures of each free and
independent state, as they now call themselves, in such a situation that
they will eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or
dwindle into petty corporations, and have power over little else than
yoaking logs, of determining the width of cart wheels."9
Montezuma continued that state legislatures would be powerless when the
national government exercised exclusive control over commerce and the power
to wage war, make peace, coin money, borrow money, organize the militia and
call them forth to crush insurrections. 1" By eliminating the powers of the
states, the clouds of popular insurrection would likewise be broken.'9
Another Antifederalist writer, using the name John DeWitt, posed similar
arguments to the people of Massachusetts to influence the ratification convention
194. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 40 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 40-41.
197. Id. at 63.
198. Id. at 64.
199. Id.
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in that state. The writer, whose true identity is unknown, argued that the strong
national government would swallow up the state governments in a hasty stride
to a Universal Empire in the Western World. The predicted result was a loss
of the people's liberty.' Again, the Antifederalist argument was that
retention of power by the states was necessary to secure the rights of the
people."0
The Antifederalists, while believing the people's rights would be protected
best by strong state governments, did not trust those governments. Federalists
also distrusted state governments. Both groups distrusted any government
because, as George Mason stated, "considering the natural lust of power so
inherent in man, I fear the thirst of power will prevail to oppress the
people."' James Madison similarly distrusted not only man's ambition for
pre-eminence and power but also the factionalism posed by groups of men
organized and pursuing narrow interests under the banner of state
government. 2D3
The Revolutionary era and state constitutions illustrate the distrust of the
states' power. It should not be surprising that Americans in the midst of a
revolution against tyranny would be suspicious of government, particularly when
dealing with plans for their own government. As a consequence, most of the
state constitutions of the era vested primary governing authority in a popularly
elected legislative branch of government, not the executive,' and contained
a statement for a bill of rights.0 5 All contained a statement that all power
originally rests in the people. 6 The state constitutions of Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania contained an explicit provision concerning the
right to bear arms. The constitutions of Maryland, New Hampshire, New York,
and Virginia identified the necessity of maintaining the militia to preserve the
free state. New York's constitution, while providing for a militia but not a right
to bear arms, also noted that Quakers could not be compelled to bear arms.
200. Id. at 104-05.
201. One leading Antifederalist shared and advocated this view. Mason argued that the people's
political happiness rested on the state governments because the states, as smaller political units,
provided more direct representation of the people. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 194, at 272.
202. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1052 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
203. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
204. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (Ben Poore Perley ed.,
1924); Maryland, 817; Massachusetts, 956; New Hampshire, 1279, New Jersey, 1310 (religion);
New York, 1329; North Carolina, 1409; Pennsylvania, 1540; South Carolina, 1640; Virginia, 1910.
205. Id.; Maryland, 817; Massachusetts, 956; New Hampshire, 1279 (Bill of Rights added
1784); New Jersey religion; New York, 1329 (militia, religion); North Carolina, 409; Pennsylvania,
1540; Virginia, 1910.
206. Id.; Massachusetts, 956; Maryland, 817; New Hampshire, 1279; New Jersey, 1310; New
York, 1329; North Carolina, 1409; Virginia, 1910.
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Similarly, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia provided for a militia but
not explicitly for the right to bear arms. They also provided for popular revolt
by giving the people the right to reform the government and the right to defend
their life and liberty 7 and by providing that the doctrine of non-resistance
against arbitrary power is slavish, absurd, and destructive." In context,
providing for the militia, defined at this time as the body of people all bearing
arms, appears to be the functional equivalent of providing each individual with
the right to bear arms.
VI. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
With ratification complete and the First Congress assembled, James
Madison introduced amendments setting forth what would eventually become the
Bill of Rights. The ratification process had produced a call for such a
declaration. Madison and Hamilton had argued that ratification must precede
amendment and now the time had come to honor the implied promise that
amendments would be made. Madison campaigned for a seat in the first
Congress on the pledge that he favored amendments. 20 9
Madison's first proposal was made on June 8, 1789, to the House of
Representatives. It embodied nineteen substantive items and appeared to track
the suggestions made by the various state conventions. Madison's first proposal
was not in the form of a separate Bill of Rights. Instead, he proposed
amendment by interlineation, placement of the individual amendments in the text
of the Constitution. One of the proposed amendments was "that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, a well-armed and well-
regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no conscientious
objector shall be compelled to render military service in person.""'
Madison's proposal called for this right and the right to freedom of the press,
religion, and speech, to be inserted in Article 1, Section 9, between clauses 3
and 4. Article 1, Section 9 concerns limitations on Congress's power over
citizens, namely, no suspension of habeas corpus, no ex post facto laws, and no
bills of attainder. Madison's suggested placement of this amendment
demonstrates that he understood the right to bear arms to be an individual right.
Had Madison viewed the right as the states' right, the more logical placement
of the right would have been in Article 1, Section 8, clause 16, which reserves
to the states the power to appoint the officers of the militia and provides
authority to train the same.
207. Id.; New Hampshire, 1279.
208. Id.; Maryland, 818; Virginia, 1909.
209. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 33 (1957).
210. Hardy, Arned Citzens, supra note 12, at 609.
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In addition, Madison's notes regarding the introduction of his proposals
contain an outline which suggests he should read the amendments and explain
that they first relate to private rights. He then instructed himself to explain the
deficiencies of the English Declaration of Rights. Among the deficiencies was
that the declaration was a mere act of Parliament and that guarantees were not
sufficiency broad, namely, no freedom of press or conscience and the restriction
of arms to Protestants.2 '
Madison's proposals were referred to a select committee that reported to
the House sitting as a committee of the whole. When the proposal left the select
committee, it read:
A well regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people, being
the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous
shall be compelled to bear arms.
212
In the House, the debate focused on the last clause. The argument was as
follows:
Mr. Gerry - This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to
secure the people against the maladministration of the Governments if
we could suppose that, in all cases, the rights of the people would be
attended to, the occasion for guards of this kind would be removed.
Now, I am apprehensive that this clause would give an opportunity to
the people in power to destroy the Constitution itself. They can
declare who are those religiously scrupulous and prevent them from
bearing arms.
211
An amendment to remove the "religiously scrupulous" language failed.214
Madison yielded to pressure to set forth amendments at the end of Constitution.
Seventeen articles of amendment were sent to the Senate."'
The Senate streamlined the package by combining some amendments and
simplifying others. On the right to bear arms, the Senate omitted the words
"composed of the body of the people" and deleted the provision exempting
211. Id.
212. THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 211 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
213. Id.
214. See WILLIAM MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 123 (1986).
215. The House labeled its sections of what became the Bill of Rights as "articles." See Mark
P, Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156, 1166 (1986).
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conscientious objectors from service.21 The Senate rejected language that
would have added the words, "for the common defense" as part of the phrase
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms (for the common defense) shall
not be infringed." 217 Ultimately twelve articles were sent to the states for
ratification. The first two failed, but the other ten were ratified.218  The
language of the Second Amendment, as adopted, read:
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed.2 9
VI. CONCLUSION
English history made two things clear to the American revolutionaries:
force of arms was the only effective check on government, and standing armies
threatened liberty. Recognition of these premises meant that the force of arms
necessary to check government had to be placed in the hands of citizens. The
English theorists Blackstone and Harrington advocated these tenants. Because
the public purpose of the right to keep arms was to check government, the right
necessarily belonged to the individual and, as a matter of theory, was thought
to be absolute in that it could not be abrogated by the prevailing rulers.
These views were adopted by the framers, both Federalists and
Antifederalists. Neither group trusted government. Both believed the greatest
danger to the new republic was tyrannical government and that the ultimate
check on tyranny was an armed population. It is beyond dispute that the second
amendment right was to serve the same public purpose as advocated by the
English theorists. The check on all government, not simply the federal
government, was the armed population, the militia. Government would not be
accorded the power to create a select militia since such a body would become
the government's instrument. The whole of the population would comprise the
militia. As the constitutional debates prove, the framers recognized that the
common public purpose of preserving freedom would be served by protecting
each individual's right to arms, thus empowering the people to resist tyranny and
preserve the republic. The intent was not to create a right for other
216. DUMBAULD, supra note 209, at 46.
217. The Senate did so without explanation. See Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 12, at 611.
218. Of the two amendments that were defeated, one concerned the apportionment of
representatives, and the other would have prevented congressional salary increases from taking effect
until after the next election of representatives. Peter Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional
Amendments. Federalism Versus Democracy, 20 U. MICH. J. L. 409, 440 (1987). The ten
amendments that were ratified became the Bill of Rights in 1791. Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of
the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 115, 118 (1992).
219. U.S. CONST. amend II.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/5
1994] SECOND AMENDMENT 1039
governments, the individual states; it was to preserve the people's right to a free
state, just as it says.
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